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1. Introduction
CO2 capture and geological storage (CCS) is now recognised as
an important technological option for carbon abatement
within Europe. Whilst our focus in the European Commis-
sion-funded Acceptance of CO2 Capture, Storage, Economics,
Policy and Technology (ACCSEPT) project was primarily on the
acceptability of CCS within the EU27 nations, non-EU
countries such as Norway and Switzerland are important
players in CCS research, development and demonstration
(RD&D), hence our interest extended somewhat beyond the EU
countries. The ACCSEPT project framed the challenges
surrounding adoption of CCS in Europe via a number of
critical questions which need to be addressed before CCS
could be reliably, effectively, efficiently, equitably and safely
implemented within the EU. The questions are as follows:
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a b s t r a c t
The ACCSEPT project, which ran from January 2006 to December 2007, identified and
analysed the main factors which have been influencing the emergence of CO2 capture
and geological storage (CCS) within the European Union (EU). The key clusters of factors
concern science and technology, law and regulation, economics, and social acceptance.
These factors have been analysed through interviews, a large-scale questionnaire con-
ducted in 2006, and discussions in two stakeholder workshops (2006 and 2007). In Part I of
this paper, we aim to distil the key messages and findings with regards to scientific,
technical, legal and economic issues. There are no compelling scientific, technical, legal,
or economic reasons why CCS could not be widely deployed in the forthcoming decades as
part of a package of climate changemitigation options. In order to facilitate this deployment,
governments at both the EU and Member State levels have an important role to play, in
particular in establishing a robust and transparent legal framework (e.g. governing long-
term environmental liability) and a strong policy framework providing sufficient and long-
term incentives for CCS and CO2 transportation networks.
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1. Is CCS geologically feasiblewithin the EU andwhat storage
capacities are available?
2. Can the risks of CCS be appropriately assessed and
managed?
3. Can CCS be undertaken under existing international and
European law?
4. Is there sufficient fossil fuel to make investment in CCS
worthwhile in the long term?
5. How large are the externalities arising from CCS and how
important are they?
6. Is the information on the costs of CCS good enough to
make robust decisions?
7. What policies can help to make CCS more economically
feasible?
8. Is CCS acceptable to European stakeholders?
9. Is CCS acceptable to the European public?
10. How should CCS be communicated to the European
public?
11. Can CCS be incorporated into the clean development
mechanism (CDM) and what might be the impacts of this
upon carbon markets and other CDM projects?
12. Will investment in CCS detract from the development
and deployment of other zero- and low-carbon energy
sources?
In Part I of this paper we address the technical and
economic questions 1 through 7, whilst in Part II we tackle the
remaining questions 8–12. The more detailed background
analyses are available on the ACCSEPT project website
(www.accsept.org), along with detailed recommendations to
Europe’s energy policy makers (ACCSEPT, 2007). We first set
the scene with a discussion of recent EU energy policy and the
possible future role of CCS.
2. The potential role of CCS within the
European Union
At its spring meeting in 2007, the European Council adopted a
EuropeanEnergyAction Planwith the three goals of security of
supply, efficiency and environmental compatibility. Ensuring
the competitiveness of European industry and technology is a
further important ambition of European energy policymaking,
in pursuit of the Lisbon Agenda. The Council gave clear
commitments to promoting renewable energies, supplemen-
ted by introducing efficiency and energy savings measures. In
addition, consent was given to the need for sustainable use of
fossil fuels, and to work towards strengthening RD&D and
developing the necessary technical, economic and regulatory
frameworks to bring environmentally safe carbon dioxide
capture, transport and storage solutions tomarkets, if possible
by 2020.
In January 2007, the European Commission published a
Communication to the Council and European Parliament on
Sustainable Power Generation from Fossil Fuels: Aiming for Near-
Zero Emissions from Coal after 2020 (European Commission,
2007a). This document establishes the need for CCS and for
policy development to assist in its wide deployment. The
Communication notes that: ‘‘. . .coal can continue to make its
valuable contribution to the security of energy supply and the
economy of both the EU and the world as a whole only with
technologies allowing for drastic reduction of the carbon
footprint of its combustion’’ (European Commission, 2007a, p.
4). The Commission has declared that it will: ‘‘substantially
increase the funding for R&D in the energy area, making the
demonstration of Sustainable Fossil Fuels technologies one of
the priorities for 2007–2013. . . . the Commissionwill determine
the most suitable way to support the design, construction and
operation by 2015 of up to 12 large-scale demonstrations of
Sustainable Fossil Fuel technologies in commercial power
generation’’ (European Commission, 2007a, pp. 6–7).
With respect to its climate policy, the EU has an agreed
objective to limit global temperature increase to a maximum
of 2 8C above the pre-industrial level, implying global green-
house gas reductions of 15–50% by 2050 compared to the
emissions in 1990, and 60–80% reductions for developed
countries (European Commission, 2007b). The Commission
notes that: ‘‘it is clear that large-scale coal-based generation
with current technology and associated CO2 emissions is not
compatible with this scenario’’ (European Commission, 2007b,
p. 12). 50% of the EU’s electricity is generated from fossil fuels
(coal c. 30%, gas c. 20%). The combustion of coal in EU power
plants produced 950 Mt of CO2 in 2005,which is 24% of the EU’s
total carbon emissions and 70% of emissions from electricity
generation (European Commission, 2007a). The Commission’s
TRENDS baseline scenario considers that electricity demand
in the EU25 will increase from 3177 TWh in 2005 to 4367 TWh
in 2030 (37% increase), extrapolated to 4631 TWh in 2050 (46%
increase) (European Commission, 2007a).
The Commission notes that: ‘‘While increased use of
energy efficiency measures and greater penetration of renew-
able energy sources are expected to contribute to meeting the
increased demand, even ambitious scenarios foresee that
most electricitywill still be supplied by the traditional thermal
power plants, both fossil fuel and nuclear’’ (European
Commission, 2007a, p. 14). Whilst this view becomes less
certain as we look further forward in time, it is estimated that
the required installed thermal power plant capacity in 2030 is
800 GWproducing 3700 TWh/year. TheCommission’s analysis
assumes that the share of coal in the mix remains at around
30%. Therefore, it is assumed that there is an increase in the
overall amount of coal-based electricity generation in the EU
by 2030 compared to today. An important reason why coal
remains important is energy security which comes from
having a diverse energy supply. There are larger reserves of
coal remaining than of oil and gas, aswell as amore diverse set
of suppliers than of oil and gas, including from politically
stable parts of the world.
If we assume that the EU’s CO2 emissions need to be
reduced by 80% by 2050, then overall annual emissions from
all sources would be perhaps 760 Mt CO2 compared to
current coal-fired power plant emissions of 950 Mt CO2.
Coal-based emissions are anticipated to increase under
current trends to 1300 Mt CO2 by 2030. The combination of
this increase in coal use and an assumed need for an 80%
reduction in all CO2 emissions by 2050 implies that all coal
power plants must have CO2 capture capabilities by 2050 and
probably sooner. Whilst it may be technically feasible to
meet the CO2 reduction target by using other low-carbon
energy technologies, the retention of coal for reasons of
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supply security and cost has been repeatedly expressed as a
European priority. Approximately 75% of the coal-fired
power plants in the EU27 are over 25 years old and 45%
are over 30 years old (European Commission, 2007a). This
suggests that several hundred units, representing 100 GWe,
are facing retirement, or life extension through retrofitting,
within the next 10–15 years (European Commission, 2007a).
The Commission noted that: ‘‘Replacement of these plants
with coal-fired generating capacity to maintain a diverse
energy mix will only be publicly acceptable, compatible with
the EU’s climate change objectives, and may only be
economically viable if specific CO2 emissions are reduced
drastically’’ (European Commission, 2007a, p. 14).
3. Creating a policy framework to facilitate the
development of CCS
In January 2008 the European Commission produced a raft of
proposed legislative measures called the ‘‘climate action and
renewable energy package’’, aimed at delivering the EU’s
greenhouse gas reduction and renewable energy objectives for
2020. As part of the package the Commission proposed a
Directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, along
with a detailed Impact Assessment and a statement on
supporting early demonstration of sustainable power genera-
tion from fossil fuels (European Commission, 2008a,b,c
respectively). The proposedDirectivewill, if adopted, establish
a bespoke legal framework to regulate the storage of captured
CO2 in the EU. It aims to cover the entire life-cycle of a
geological storage site, from site selection and operation
requirements, through to closure obligations and the transfer
of post-closure responsibilities to competent authorities of
Member States but only after there is near certainty that the
possibility of leakage has been reduced to zero. Although the
Directive’s focus is on storage, it will also mesh with existing
legislative instruments, which will be amended so that they
explicitly cover the capture and transport components of CCS
activities. In doing so, it is intended to clarify existing
legislation and remove barriers that currently restrict the
large-scale development of CCS facilities, particularly in
relation to waste, water and industrial emissions legislation.
The proposed Directive also includes a requirement that new
power plants be built as ‘capture-ready’, hence capable of
being equipped with CO2 capture plant and with suitable
geological storage sites and transport routes having been
identified.
In 2007 the Commission had noted that it: ‘‘believes that by
2020 all new coal-fired plants should be built with CCS’’
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 10). It argued that ‘‘a clear
and predictable long-term framework is necessary to facilitate
a smooth and rapid transition to a CCS-equipped power
generation from coal’’ (European Commission, 2007a) and
explored three possible incentives.
 Establishing a more favourable long-term investment
framework by ‘‘ensuring the relative perpetuity of the
emissions trading scheme and by facilitating commercial
financing and risk-sharing instruments’’ (European Com-
mission, 2007a, p. 10).
 Developing EU CO2 storage sites and pipelines formulti-user
access or projects for CO2 infrastructure development at
Member State level.
 ‘‘Adopting legally binding measures to regulate maximum
allowed CO2 emissions per kWh after 2020 and/or introduce
a timed phase-out (for instance by 2050) of all high CO2
emitting (i.e. non-CCS) electricity generation’’ (European
Commission, 2007a, p. 10).
The Commission undertook an assessment of different
policy options with respect to sustainable power generation
from fossil fuels against the EU’s energy policy objectives
(European Commission, 2007b). The three policy options
considered were:
 Option 0: No policy change,
 Option 1: Removal of barriers to sustainable coal technol-
ogies,
 Option 2: Pro-active introduction of incentives for the
penetration of sustainable coal technologies.
Under Option 0, there is a reduction in CO2 emissions from
coal-fired power plant due to efficiency gains but more
significantly because of the replacement of coal by other
energy sources, in particular natural gas. This increased use of
gas raises considerable problems from an energy security
perspective. The Commission concluded that: ‘‘If the twin
benefits of secure energy supplies and environmentally
sustainable energy are to be secured in the EU, No Policy
Change is not an option’’ (European Commission, 2007b, p. 48).
Policy Option 1 leaves the penetration of sustainable coal
technologies to the existing market framework and the
Commission noted that: ‘‘Its success is therefore entirely
reliant upon the economics for clean coal and CCS being
attractive to investors in the period after the technologies are
demonstrated and are commercially available’’ (European
Commission, 2007b, p. 49). In other words, the uptake of CCS
would require high gas prices relative to coal, a high value for
CO2 under the EU ETS and an RD&D strategy which
successfully brings down the cost of CO2 capture. Investors
would only support CCS for coal-fired generation if sufficiently
high CO2 emission permit prices (s20–40 per tCO2) were
anticipated in the next several decades. Policy Option 1 is
therefore a risky approach since it relies upon economic
variables which are historically volatile and uncertain.
Policy Option 2 would make adoption of CCS for all new
coal-fired plant a requirement after 2020 (not included in the
proposed Directive) and would develop an ‘enhanced’ version
of the EU ETS. The enhanced EU ETS would ‘‘establish
generally [a] more favourable framework for long term
investment in low-emission technologies by introducing a
concept of ‘relative perpetuity’’’ (European Commission,
2007b, p. 31). Possible incentive mechanisms mentioned by
the Commission include: privileged access to the electricity
pool for zero-emissions power; high buy-back prices for
‘sustainable electricity’; an obligation imposed upon suppliers
to include aminimumshare of ‘sustainable electricity’; and/or
timed phase-out of high CO2-emitting installations. The
Commission noted that: ‘‘If there is too much uncertainty
around Option 1 to ensure continued unhindered presence of
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coal in themix, policy Option 2 offers a range ofmeasures that
could be adopted to secure the objectives’’ (European
Commission, 2007b, p. 51).
In its 2008 Impact Assessment, the European Commission
(2008a) used a range of analytical tools to assess the costs and
benefits (including potential positive externalities) of different
policy options for CCS support. These options ranged from
doing nothing, including CCS in the EU ETS, to various
permutations of a CCS mandate (for new coal power plant
from 2020; new coal and gas plant from 2020; new coal from
2020 and retrofit of coal built from 2015; new coal and gas from
2020 and retrofit of plant built from2015) and, finally, inclusion
of CCS in EU ETS with a subsidy. In this later document, the
Commission came down in favour of the option of inclusion of
CCS within the EU ETS, and argues against a CCS mandate or
subsidy, an apparent change of position from the 2007
statement. The results of economic modelling are the main
reason for this change, but the conclusion relies upon the
ability of the EU ETS to provide a sufficiently strong economic
incentive for CCS development; other commentators are less
convinced that European politicians will be minded to stick
with a tough carbon emission cap in Phase 3 of the scheme
(Lockwood, 2008). Industry is, arguably, already discounting
the price of CO2 on the EU ETS, thus favouring new coal rather
than gas power plant build, which could thereby enhance
carbon lock-in and further increase the tendency for politi-
cians to argue for a less demanding carbon cap (Lockwood,
2008).
In conclusion, it can be seen that CCS has become very
firmly embedded in the energy and climate change policy
making of the EU over the past 2–3 years. At the time of
writing, the details of the proposed Directive are being
negotiated within the European Parliament and with the
Member States and the issue of a CCS mandate or Emission
Performance Standard is still ‘on the table’. The Commission
(2008b) has proposed a separate mechanism by which
financial support for the first tranche of CCS demonstration
projects can be secured, though the details of how financing
will occur are currently uncertain and somewhat controver-
sial. However, all this assumes that CCS is technically feasible,
credible and desirable within Europe and we now turn to
address these questions.
4. Is CCS geologically feasible within the EU
and what storage capacities are available?
There are numerous sedimentary basins and geological
reservoirs within the EU that are judged suitable for CO2
storage. The major, suitable off-shore sedimentary basins are
located in: theNorth Sea, theHebrides, theNorwegian Sea, the
Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea (four
basins) and off the Iberian Peninsula. The major on-shore
sedimentary basins are located in or below: Denmark, the
North German Plain, Hungary, the Carpathians, Molasse,
Paris, SE and parts of northern England, Belgium, the
Appenines (Italy), Sicily, SW France, and Spain (three basins).
The Zero Emission Power Plant Platform (ZEP) estimates that
the Utsira formation in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea
could be used for the storage of 2 billion tonnes of CO2 each
year (ZEP, 2006), which is probably enough storage capacity for
the foreseeable CCS projects in the EU for at least the next 20–
30 years. The EU Commission quotes IEA estimates that the
Norwegian sector of the Utsira formation is capable of storing
up to 600 billion tonnes of CO2 and that this would allow
storage of all of the EU’s CO2 emissions (at current levels) for
over 300 years (European Commission, 2007a).
Questions have been raised regarding the accuracy of these
estimates, however, the problem being that there is no agreed
methodology for calculating the storage capacity of saline
aquifers for CO2 storage (Holloway et al., 2006a,b; Bachu et al.,
2007; Bradshaw et al., 2007). One method is to assume that
storage occurs only in the structural traps for buoyant fluids
and that a proportionof this volumewould be available for CO2
storage. A second method is to assume that a fraction of the
total pore volume of all potential reservoir formations would
be available for CO2 storage, a method which Holloway et al.
(2006a) now consider to be inadequate and likely to give too
high an estimate of the storage capacity. The aquifer storage
capacity of the UK sector of the North Sea according to the first
method is nearly 9 billion tonnes CO2, whilst it is up to 240
billion tonnes according to the second method, i.e. 27 times
larger than the lower estimate. It is this secondmethod which
is used to derive the figure of 600 billion tonnes CO2 storage
capacity for the Utsira formation; hence that figure is not
reliable and more detailed work is required to derive a more
realistic value.
Other EU 6th Framework Programme (FP) funded projects
are examining the geological storage capacities of reservoirs
within the European Union. Several projects in particular are
worth mentioning: GeoCapacity, CO2GEONET, CCS-SCEN and
CO2ReMoVe. It is anticipated that these projects will provide a
more reliable basis for estimating CO2 storage capacity within
the EU and more widely. Some of the differences in capacity
measurement are discussed in Bradshaw et al. (2007), Bachu
et al. (2007) and in a report of the Technical Group of the
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) (Technical
Group, 2008). The latter report indicates that a confidence
indicator can be given to measurements of capacity based
upon two variables: the subsurface heterogeneity and the data
density.
In conclusion,whilst there are certainly abundant potential
reservoirs for CO2 storage, at this stage it is difficult to provide
reliable estimates of CO2 storage capacities in European
reservoirs. The European Commission’s Impact Assessment
(2008b) included an analysis of CO2 sources and geological
reservoirs and concluded that there was sufficient storage
capacity to 2030, and at a reasonable cost, under the
deployment scenarios examined; furthermore, there was
sufficient storage capacity in nearly all countries for domes-
tically-produced power plant CO2 to be stored in the country of
origin, though this required the use of deep aquifers in
addition to depleted oil and gas fields.Morework on producing
valid methodologies for storage capacity estimation and
applying these methods to produce more robust capacity
estimates, is underway within 6th FP funded projects and
through other initiatives in the CSLF and the Regional Carbon
Sequestration Partnerships Program in North America. Exist-
ing estimates based upon controversial methodologies,
including the 600 billion tonne storage capacity claim for
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the Utsira formation, should not be used in policy making
because the attendant uncertainties surrounding the validity
of such estimates are too large. Furthermore, only large point
source emissions of CO2 are amenable to capturewith existing
technologies, and these sources are not necessarily located
close to potential sinks. Claims that all of the European
Union’s CO2 emissions for the next several hundred years
could be stored in saline aquifers cannot, at the current time,
be justified and could give a misleading impression to policy
makers.
5. Can the risks of CCS be appropriately
assessed and managed?
The risks of CCS are difficult to define and identify, not just
technically, but in terms of the way different people and
organisations understand and interpret risks. It is noted, for
example, that in looking at the risks of CCS, one has to
consider the risks both of implementing it and of not
implementing it. The precautionary principle applies as much
to employing CCS to avoid global warming as it does to
avoiding leakage from CCS. The basic conclusion of an
examination of potential risks is that, because the risks from
climate change due to fossil fuel emissions are larger and far
more difficult to manage than the risks from CCS, the risk of
leakage from storage should not impede CCS development
overall. From this perspective, it is important to move quickly
and to learn by doing.
The message is not that environmental risks need to be
ignored however: rather, the already identified major risks
incurred by CCS should be guiding the initial decisions about
site location and exploitation, and ongoing monitoring and
evaluation should be robust enough to draw further conclu-
sions. Whilst risks from CCS are often presented as technical
risks posed by introducing CO2 into a new environmental
context, and the unintended consequences thereof, it may
well be that management decisions about storage are as
important as, if not more important than, physical risks. This
is to say that because geological sites can be found and
managed in such a way as to all but rule out leakage, does not
mean theywill be found andmanaged in that way if the proper
guidelines, incentives and oversight are not in place. Many of
these elements are already in place, but need reinforcement.
To ensure that proper procedures are agreed and followed,
governments and institutions can have an important role in
harmonizing approaches, but such harmonization has to take
place at an appropriate level to guarantee enough detail is
captured to make it useful. The higher the level of discussion,
the more general is the regulation, which is appropriate for
establishing some basic principles. Much of the difficulty in
regulating CCS, however, lies in the site-specific nature of CO2
storage and associated risks. Hence, diverse levels of analysis
and action are needed, which will require further capacity
building and coordination.
Finally, whatever the physical reality of risk, as perceived
by scientists, industrialists or regulators, if stakeholders are
not convinced of that reality, storage may face acceptance
problems. Furthermore, stakeholders’ overall perceptions of
energy policy, and of the risks of competing low-carbon energy
options, may also influence their readiness to accept the risks
of CO2 storage. For instance, if a stakeholder considers the
risks of nuclear power to be unacceptable, yet also regards
climate change as a major environmental risk, then this is
likely to influence theway inwhich the risks of CO2 storage are
perceived. Some prominent environmental NGOs and Green
Parliamentarians have even made their support for CCS
contingent upon phase-out of nuclear power and/or of nuclear
energy RD&D (Reiner, 2008).
Risk perceptions among stakeholders and project devel-
opers may well differ, and it may be hard to settle such
differences by appeal to the ‘facts’ because of different
interpretations of the salience of those facts, and what ‘the’
facts actually are, or whether particular risks exist in the first
place. Defining risk authoritatively, in either qualitative or
quantitative terms, is difficult for new and relatively untested
technologies such as CCS. Going beyond defining risk to
communicating conclusions about risk is an added layer of
complication. It is imperative to find a common language for
the characterisation and communication of risk both among
professionals and between professionals and the public, a
topic we return to in Part 2.
6. Can CCS be undertaken under existing
international and European law?
At present, the construction and operation of a CCS project
would fall within the scope of a diverse array of international
and European law. That is not to say that a CCS project would
necessarily contravene international or European norms.
Indeed, a European company could, subject to domestic law
and strict geographic and technical conditions, set up and
operate a CCS project in accordance with existing supra-
national law. However, there are a number of unresolved legal
concerns that, until addressed, render the widespread
deployment of large-scale CCS projects impracticable. In
order to understand these concerns, it is useful to draw a
distinction between CO2 capture and transport on one hand,
and CO2 storage on the other. The most problematic legal
issues centre on CO2 storage, and so warrant particular
attention.
6.1. The capture and transport of CO2
In principle, European law is sufficiently developed to regulate
the capture and transport of captured CO2 from emission sites
to storage facilities. The capture of CO2, for example, could fall
within the scope of the IPPC Directive (96/61/EC, as amended),
even though that Directive was adopted without specific
reference to CCS activities. It imposes a permitting regime on
certain industrial and agricultural activities, and provides
that Member States are entitled to withhold permits from
companies where certain environmental conditions are not
met. Accordingly,Member States could, in theory, use the IPPC
Directive and associated legal instruments to regulate the
risks associated with CO2 capture. In this context, it is notable
that the Commission’s proposed Directive on the geological
storage of CO2 explicitly acknowledges the role of the IPPC
Directive without significant amendment, reinforcing the idea
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that the existing law is capable of regulating the capture of
CO2.
The regulation of transporting captured CO2 similarly falls,
in theory, within the scope of existing international and
European law: liquefied CO2 is already transported in
significant quantities by road, ship and pipeline across the
EU and is regulated in accordance with dangerous goods laws
and regulations. However, there are two reasons why the
existing framework on the transport of CO2 may ultimately
prove to be inadequate.
First, the scale of future CCS projects may mean that new
infrastructure is required to transport captured CO2 through
pipelines to storage sites. The construction of major project
infrastructure such as pipelines and pumping stations is likely
to be regulated by the Environmental Impact Assessment
Directive (85/337/EEC, as amended). If the construction of CCS
facilities develops at a rapid pace across national borders, it
may place an unmanageable administrative burden on
authorities charged with reviewing such assessments.
Second, the transport of CO2 bears a strong analogy with
natural gas transport. As such, it is worth bearing in mind the
European experience of that sector, which has shown that the
infrastructure required to transport large quantities of gas is
significant, requires large economies of scale and involves
long-lead times. These considerations mean that the owners
of such infrastructure are reticent to allow third party access
to thenetworkswithout adequate compensation. Competition
concerns arising from such restrictions have led to laws and
regulations dedicated to providing open and non-discrimina-
tory access to pipeline networks. Unfortunately, existing
European law on third party access does not lend itself
naturally to CCS activities. Accordingly, a bespoke third party
access regime is desirable, balancing the rights of ownership
against the benefits of allowing wider participation in the
technology or infrastructure. The Commission’s proposal on
the geological storage of CO2 recognises the shortcomings of
the existing third party access framework. It requires that
Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that
potential users are able to obtain access to CO2 transport
networks and to storage sites for the purposes of geological
storage of the produced and captured CO2.
The issues outlined above are not insurmountable obsta-
cles to the development of CCS projects. However, they do
indicate legal ‘gaps’ where existing law and regulationmay be
found wanting. Similar gaps can be found in relation to: (1)
property rights (including intellectual property rights over
capture technology and the ownership of the CO2 after
capture); (2) the role of international incentives to develop
CCS projects (such as the inclusion of such projects within the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Clean Development
Mechanism); and (3) environmental liability for the release of
captured CO2 (including the role of insurance). Some of these
gaps are of particular relevance to the capture and transport
elements of CCS. Others apply in particular to the storage of
CO2, to which we now turn. In both cases, pre-emptive
clarification of gaps in the relevant law (i.e. before the
substantive development of a CCS market) is desirable. Here,
it should be noted that whilst addressing many of the issues
set out above, the European Commission’s proposed Directive
on CCS does not sufficiently deal with all legal uncertainties
concerning the capture and transport of CO2 derived fromCCS
facilities.
6.2. The storage of CO2
The legal framework governing the long-term storage and
monitoring of captured CO2 presents the most challenging
area for legislators. There are two facets to this: (1) the
definition of captured CO2 when it is put into long-term
geological storage; and (2) liability for any escape of CO2 from
geological storage formations.
Under current European law, it is uncertain whether CO2
that is captured and then storedwould be classified as ‘waste’.
If, for example, captured CO2 was used in Enhanced Oil
Recovery (EOR), then an argument could be made that it is an
industrial product. The importance of this determination is
that if captured CO2 is deemed to be waste, then its storage
would be subject to the permitting regime under European
waste law. In certain circumstances, this could result in
potential storage sites being off-limits.
Against this background, it should be noted that the
international community has started to address these issues.
For example, the London Protocol (an international agreement
that prohibits dumpingwaste in the sea) has been amended so
as to allow the sub-seabed disposal of ‘‘CO2 streams from CO2
capture processes’’ in certain circumstances. This is a
significant step; the London Protocol had previously been a
notable international impediment to the widespread devel-
opment of CCS projects.
Putting to one side the definition of captured CO2, the
storage of CO2 raises the fundamental concern of long-term
risk allocation under international and EU law. Again,
international law has taken a lead. The OSPAR Convention
(a convention for the protection of themarine environment of
the North-East Atlantic against pollution) was amended in
June 2007 to allow the storage of CO2 in geological formations
under the seabed. In doing so, the OSPAR Commission also
announced guidelines for risk assessment and management
of CCS activities.
Like the amendments to the London Protocol, the changes
to the OSPAR Convention are an important development in
international law, and the European Commission’s draft
Directive on the geological storage of CO2 is a welcome
development. A failure to contain stored CO2 undermines the
environmental rationale for CO2 capture, and a comprehen-
sive framework is not yet in place: the current European legal
framework does not clearly define who will be responsible for
environmental harm in the event that a failure occurs once
captured CO2 has been stored.
For example, the Environmental Liability Directive (Direc-
tive 2004/35/EC) is fast becoming the overarching framework
for environmental liability within Europe. In theory, much of
the potential damage attributable to the escape of CO2 post-
injection would fall within its scope. However, it suffers three
shortcomings: (1) it does not address climate liability (damage
to the climate system caused by the escape of CO2 from
storage sites); (2) it does not extend to potential sub-seabed
geological formations; and (3) it does not impose liability if
more than 30 years have passed since the emission, event or
incident resulting in the damage occurred (given the long time
i n t e rn a t i o n a l j o u rn a l o f g r e e nhou s e g a s c on t r o l 3 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 3 3 3 – 3 4 3338
frames of CO2 storage a 30-year longstop date may prove to be
inadequate).
These issues are addressed in the Commission’s proposed
Directive on the geological storage of CO2 in a three-pronged
approach (EuropeanCommission, 2008a). First, Member States
will retain the right to determine the areas within their
competence that are suitable for storage sites. As a result, the
opportunity for exploiting speculative storage sites can be
limited by Member States taking a cautious approach to site
selection. Second, the draft Directive provides for detailed
‘storage permit’ applications (including requiring that appli-
cants put up adequate financial security to cover any liabilities
incurred whilst they are responsible for the site). Finally (and
perhaps most significantly), responsibility for the long-term
management of storage sites post-closure will transfer to the
competent authorities of Member States.
It is vital to strike the right balance in the liability regime
between government and private entities. If, for example, a
company can be held liable for leakage or migration of CO2
from a storage site several decades (or more) into the future
then it is very unlikely that that company will be prepared to
invest in CCS activities. Weighed against this consideration
are the high procedural standards that are required to ensure
the integrity of storage sites. The Commission’s proposed
Directive clearly endeavours to strike such a balance. How-
ever, in light of the discretion afforded to Member States in
relation to the selection of storage sites, it is a balance that will
need to be monitored, reviewed and (if necessary), adjusted.
7. Is there sufficient fossil fuel to make
investment in CCS worthwhile in the long-term?
It has beenwidely assumed that coal, unlike oil and gas,will be
abundant for at least another century. A recent estimate by the
US Department of Energy of coal resource life time is 164 years
at the current production rate (USDOE, 2007a). Another
estimate is that coal has a resource life of 133 years at current
production rates, i.e. a resource life of 133 years (BP, 2007). This
compares to estimated reserves of oil and gas which are
expected to last for 42–60 years respectively at current rates of
consumption (BP, 2007). There are compelling reasons for
concern regarding the reliability of such estimates. An
example is Germany where the official estimated recoverable
coal resources were reduced by 92% in 2004 because of the use
of more restrictive criteria for the depth and thickness
parameters associated with underground and surfacemining.
In the USA, the National Research Council has admitted that
the often quoted estimates of resource lifetime of coal have a
very shaky foundation (NRC, 2007). In China, only 115–192 Mt
of reported coal resources are ‘proven’ (IEA, 2007). All of
China’s ‘unproven’ coal is relatively deep, which precludes
surface mining and implies relatively low recovery rates (IEA,
2007). Although India has large coal resources at shallow
depths, the ash content of India’s remaining coal resources is
very high, which requires considerable washing and blending
with low-ash coal which must be imported (IEA, 2007). If the
potential increase in coal consumption is taken into account,
then the coal resource life decreases. The USDOE considers
that coal consumption might increase by 77% between 2005
and 2030, which would reduce the resource life globally to
about 70 years (USDOE, 2007a). It would appear that the
historical abundance of coal, which has typically been
believed to last up to tens of generations of human lifespan,
has prevented serious efforts in reliable accounting of its long-
term availability.
A new coal-fired power plant has a design life of
approximately 40–50 years. If CCSwere not to be implemented
in any seriousway until 2020, however, then itmaywell be the
case that only one generation of CCS power plants is
constructed due to the depletion of coal supplies. Aggressive,
early implementation of CCS could still be justified none-
theless, since it would find application in hundreds of power
plants built in succession to 2050 and learning can take place
with experience as it evolves from the earliest plants.
Furthermore, much learning can be incorporated into design
changes which take place through upgrading and retrofitting
of plants once they have been in operation for a number of
years. It is also worth noting that CCS could be applied to
biomass-based combustion, either with coal or by itself, and,
in this respect, the technology, and regulatory and legislative
framework, could have greater longevity than that implied by
the estimated coal resource life.
In summary, economically-accessible coal supplies are
probably not as abundant as is commonly assumed, in part
because of the rapid growth in its consumption. Even if
supplies are not guaranteed to last for ‘hundreds of years’, as is
often claimed, there are still sufficient supplies that the
current generation of coal-fired power plants will probably be
replaced before coal supplies dwindle away or become too
expensive to use for electricity generation.
8. How large are the externalities arising from
CCS and how important are they?
CCS has potential negative impacts arising from increased
coal extraction, increased sludge production from this and
from the capture process itself, increased water usage and
completely new emissions from chemical scrubbers where
post-combustion CO2 removal takes place (Rubin et al., 2007).
Because of the energy penalty of capture and compression, the
overall energy generation capacitymust be increased, and this
implies that more coal is required in regions where CCS is
installed andwhere coal use is prevalent in energy production.
This means more intensive use of existing mining and
transport infrastructure and/or development of new infra-
structure. Clearly, coal resources would also be drawn down
more rapidly with attendant impacts on landscapes, local
environmental impacts, human healthy and safety, etc.
Adoption of CCS will likely require greater use of water for
cooling purposes in power plants and for operating the capture
process itself. Estimates range from an increase in water
requirement with CO2 capture, relative to no CO2 capture, of
10–20% for Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC), 90–
100% for pulverised coal post-combustion capture, and 55% for
Natural Gas Combined Cycle post-combustion capture
(USDOE, 2007b). Already, some thermal power plants in the
EU face the problem of insufficient water for cooling purposes
at times of water stress. If CCS were to make this situation
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worse, then it could pose a problem, though provisions might
be made for temporarily reducing or stopping CO2 capture
altogether should water supplies come under stress. There-
fore, there is a high probability that capture plants will have
lower capture efficiency in hotter, drier regions where general
scarcity ofwater and periodicwater stress are common. Use of
amine-based scrubbers could also pose problems in terms of
local pollution that are not currently well understood.
A related externality regarding CCS is that some of the
potential CO2 storage sites might also find an application as a
storage site for other substances, such as compressed air in
association with renewable energy systems, or indeed of
natural gas. This could complicate the economic assessment
of CCS if regard has not been taken of these possible further
applications. In summary, there are a range of potentially
negative externalities associated with CCS which have not yet
been thoroughly investigated but require detailed scrutiny to
ensure that negative impacts can be averted or ameliorated.
9. Is the information on the costs of CCS good
enough to make robust decisions?
Decision making by corporate entities and public bodies on
CCS projects is influenced to a large extent by the perceived
costs. Numerous studies on the costs of CCS exist in the peer-
reviewed literature, including economic modelling using
various models, the present state of affairs having been
summarised in several recent reviews (IPCC, 2005; MIT, 2007;
IPCC, 2007). Behind thiswealth of information, however,many
gaps and uncertainties still exist (de Coninck et al., 2007; MIT,
2007). Below we assess the main information gaps and
problems.
 Referencing same work: despite the large number of
engineering-cost studies, most of those studies use data
from just a few base studies. The considerable body of
literature creates the impression that many independent
sources converge on cost estimates, but, in reality, those
many sources share a few common origins. The IPCC (2005)
typically reviewed between three and six separate engineer-
ing-cost studies for a range of technology design options,
whilst MIT (2007) reviewed seven design and cost studies.
The MIT study noted that: ‘‘Several studies that were on a
substantially different basis or fell well outside the range
expected were not included in the analysis because there
was no adequate way to effectively evaluate them’’ (MIT,
2007, p. 127).
 Changes in fuel and material costs: most studies assume
pre-2005 oil and gas prices and do not take account of the
rising costs of materials, particularly steel prices. This
mostly affects steel-intensive options with already high
investment costs, in particular integrated gasification
combined cycle systems with CO2 capture, often hailed as
a low-cost CCS option basedon outdated fuel and steel costs.
MIT (2007) estimates that the rise in construction costs
increases the capital costs of power plants by 25–35%
relative to the situation in 2004.
 Confidentiality: CCS technologies have evolved largely
from existing, commercial technologies rather than from
public sector R&D. Corporate entities are motivated to
protect their intellectual property through patents, con-
fidentiality agreements and keeping information secret,
because it is through exploitation of such proprietary
knowledge that they add value to their enterprises.
Detailed information on CCS technologies and their costs
is, therefore, not fully available in the public domain and
it is difficult for independent researchers to assess the
validity of assumptions in their cost models without
access to such data.
 Technology advocacy and optimism: There are approxi-
mately one to two thousand experts working on CCS
worldwide, this number having grown from a couple of
hundred individuals only 2 or 3 years ago.We know from the
experience of other energy technologies, in particular
nuclear, that there is a tendency for those working on a
particular technology to over promote the virtues of their
own option and to under promote the case of competitor
technologies. Those closely involved in developing a
particular technological option frequently need to attract
policy attention and resources, and this may lead them to
underestimate the costs, leading to information bias.
 Risks: Before new technologies such as CCS can be
implemented, corporate decision-makers need to find a
way of incorporating technological and policy risks in their
investment decisions. Whilst confidence in CCS has been
growing rapidly, the risks of seepage (also known as leakage)
are still uncertain, as are the scale-up costs for CO2 capture
from a fully-fledged power plant.
 Policy interactions: the future development of CCS depends
to a considerable extent upon policy frameworks and the
implementation of economic incentives. The uncertainty
surrounding the course of future policy development
therefore generates large uncertainties regarding the costs
of CCS development.
Unless these different sources of uncertainty are taken into
account by all decision-makers, modellers, policymakers and
the private sector alike, poor decisions on CCS may be taken,
resulting in disappointment and harming the reputation of
CCS.
10. What policies can help to make CCS more
economically feasible?
With the exception of some niche CO2-based Enhanced Oil
Recovery projects, the only reason why CCS is implemented is
to reduce CO2 emissions. Hence, the economic feasibility of
CCS depends upon the readiness of governments to inter-
nalise the external costs of CO2 emissions. Public bodies may
also have a role in encouraging infrastructure development,
e.g. should the costs of establishing a CO2 transport infra-
structure be coordinated on the EU level rather than on the
national level? To further investigate the technical and
economic feasibility of CCS, we consulted experts from the
private sector, especially those companies that are active in
the field of CCS. The view of such companies matters because
if they perceive the technical or economic risks to be too high,
CCS will not be deployed.
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10.1. What policies can be considered for incentivising
CCS?
The core instrument of EU policymaking to address climate
change in large industrial sectors is the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS). CCSwouldhave to be supportedby this scheme,
and legislation for that to be possible is in the making.
However, even if the ETS could be guaranteed over a longer
time horizon than at present, and the price signal were high
enough for structural deployment of CCS, it may not fully
address the barriers (economic and otherwise) that exist for
new technologies such as CCS. In order to promote and
accelerate technological advance, it may be justified to
consider additional policies to complement the ETS. Such
policy measures are currently being considered both at the EU
and Member State levels.
Member State policies that could enhance the economic
feasibility of CCS include investment support for demon-
stration projects, guaranteed CO2 prices to enable domestic
implementation, and feed-in subsidies for CCS-based
electricity supply. EU-level policies under consideration
to complement the ETS include a portfolio standard
(a requirement to source a minimum percentage of
electricity from a specific kind of sustainable energy source
or fuel, probably combined with tradable certificates), an
emission standard for power production, or an obligation to
capture and store CO2 from the power sector and other large
point sources. Incentive mechanisms for CCS need to
recognise the maturity of the technology, which differs
per application. CCS in the power sector, for instance, is not
yet fully demonstrated on the scale that will probably be
required. An argument can be made for the use of fixed-
price tariffs as incentives in such instances, as opposed to
market-based schemes, which are more appropriate for
well-proven technologies (UKERC, 2007; de Coninck and
Groenenberg, 2007).
10.2. Is an EU-wide CO2 transport infrastructure
economical?
Based on the specific characteristics of the CO2-source/
reservoir distribution in Europe, a coordinated CO2 infra-
structure that serves a number of capture and storage
operations, as well as a number of countries, may be more
efficient than leaving the transport logistics to each indivi-
dual project or country. It is therefore recommended that the
institutional design of such a network is considered,
especially if analysis indicates that CCS could be deployed
at a large number of facilities. Since the eventual deployment
of CCS may be contingent upon the success of such a pan-
European network, the role of the EU in coordinating such a
CO2 pipeline network may be important. The actual arrange-
ment and ownership, including the formation of a public–
private sector partnership for the trans-boundary CO2 net-
work, could be organised amongst the Member States. The
way that the distribution of natural gas is governed could
serve as a useful precedent, although the problems encoun-
tered in the management of that system in the recent past,
and subsequent lessons learned, will need to be taken into
account.
10.3. How does the private sector perceive the risks of
CCS?
Interviews with companies that are faced with making an
investment decision on a CCS project have shown that these
firmsare quite optimistic about the future economic feasibility
of CCS. The discussions about climate change policies in the
EU, and the ambitious emission targets set by the European
Council and the EUMember States, are interpreted by firms as
clear signals that policies will be developed in the short term,
possibly even before the investment decisions for their
projects. As yet, however, there have been no positive
investment decisions regarding potential large-scale demon-
stration projects; in fact, several proposals have already been
cancelled because of increasing costs and disappointing
projected revenues (the Magnum project of Nuon in the
Netherlands; the Miller-Peterhead project of BP in Scotland;
and the Tjellbergodden project in Norway).
The companies are not worried that CO2 capture and
storage will fail for technical reasons. One of the concerns,
however, is potential public resistance to CCS, and some
companies indicate that governments should step in to
provide neutral information to the lay public. A paradox
emerged during discussions with firms on the risk of seepage
and liability transfer. On the one hand, most companies
express a high degree of confidence regarding the permanence
of CO2 storage in geological reservoirs. On the other hand, they
are unwilling to remain liable for those reservoirs for a long
time after site abandonment. A common explanation for this
apparent discrepancy is that the lifetime of private site
operators is generally shorter than the lifetime of the State,
which would make the State the more appropriate organisa-
tion for assuming long-term liability. Suggestions are to limit
the responsibility of the firm to several years (e.g. 10 years)
after site closure, and/or to create a fund that could be used in
situations where unexpected risks became evident only after
the liability period of the private sector.
11. Conclusions
In order to limit climate change it has been estimated that CO2
reductions of between 60% and 80% in 2050, compared to 1990,
are required for industrialised countries such as those of the
EU. Current trends and projections show an increased use of
coal in the EU over the coming decades. If climate change
policy objectives are to be met concurrently with coal and gas
remaining an important part of the fuel mix for European
electricity generation, then the implementation of CCS will be
necessary in the EU.
There are numerous potential geological storage sites for
CO2 in Europe, though as yet there is no robust methodology
for calculating CO2 storage volumes, particularly in saline
aquifers. Current estimates of storage volumes can differ by
a factor of 30. Nevertheless, even using more conservative
assumptions, storage volumes for different reservoirs range
from millions to billions of tonnes of CO2. Hence, there is
sufficient storage volume for CCS to be regarded as a
major option even if the larger estimates of storage volumes
prove to be over-optimistic. Some of the reservoirs are
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within reasonable transport distance of major sources of
CO2, but other sources of CO2 are not in close proximity of
suitable storage formations. Until more reliable methodol-
ogies are available, it is prudent for the geological commu-
nity to err on the side of caution when presenting estimated
storage volumes (see, e.g., Bachu et al., 2007).
The growing body of knowledge on the risks of CCS should
be guiding our initial decisions about site location and
exploitation, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation should
be robust enough to draw further conclusions. Management
decisions about storage are as important as, if not more
important than, physical risks. Because geological sites can be
found and managed safely in such a way as to all but rule out
leakage, does notmean theywill be found andmanaged in that
way if the proper guidelines, incentives and oversight are not
in place.
There are no insurmountable legal barriers to CCS deploy-
ment in the EU. However, a number of issues or ‘gaps’ in the
present international and European framework need to be
addressed. In particular, although each stage of the CCS
process raises potential legal concerns, the long-term storage
of CO2, and the need to implement a robust liability regime for
that storage, presents the most significant challenge for
legislators. Appropriate risk allocation between government
and private entities, together with the need to incentivise CCS
projects, means that a bespoke legal instrument is likely to be
required. In this context, it is vital to strike the right balance
between encouraging investment and maintaining the high
procedural standards necessary to ensure the integrity of the
environmental rationale for developing CCS technologies.
It is commonly stated that coal supplies are sufficient to
last for ‘hundreds of years’, but recent re-evaluations of
supplies in several countries indicate that there is more
uncertainty over the longevity of supplies than has been
generally acknowledged. Given a likely increase in the
demand for coal, furthermore, supplies might diminish even
more rapidly. The uncertainty surrounding coal supplies does
not imply that CCS should not be implemented, however,
because many hundreds of coal-fired power plants will likely
be constructed worldwide over the next several decades, and
CCS can be deployed progressively and more efficiently with
the build-up of know-how.
CCS has potential negative externalities, e.g. greater
utilisation of coal with associated impacts, greater demand
for water for cooling and running the capture process, an
extensive CO2 pipeline infrastructure with space claims and
risks, potential conflicts with other users of geological storage
reservoirs, etc. The nature and cost of these externalities are
not currently well understood and more research is therefore
needed.
Existing information on the costs of implementing CCS is
poor and potentially misleading. Much of the detailed
information is held by the private sector and is confidential.
Analyses in the academic literature tend to be based on just a
few sources, and have not been updated to take account of
rising fuel andmaterial costs. Before a decision on appropriate
policy for CCS is made, a thorough and updated assessment of
the costs of CCS should be undertaken. There is, otherwise, a
risk of underestimating the costs due to a range of factors.
Budgets will be exceeded if decisions are taken on incorrect
information, whichwould harm the overall acceptance of CCS
and disappoint those expecting a cost-effective solution. An
effort should be made to ensure that energy modellers are
employing realistic cost levels (especially those analysts who
are doing studies directly used for policymaking, e.g. Impact
Assessments).
The European Commission’s own analysis of 2007 suggests
that there is a risk that CCS will not be deployed at a sufficient
scale sufficiently rapidly to meet climate change objectives
without the implementation of economic incentives and/or
regulation (in addition to the Emissions Trading Scheme). EU-
level policies that have been under consideration to comple-
ment the ETS include a portfolio standard (a requirement to
source a minimum percentage of electricity from a specific
kind of sustainable energy source or fuel, probably combined
with tradable certificates), an emission standard for power
production, or an obligation to capture and store CO2 from all
fossil-fuel-fired power production and other large point
sources. The Commission (2008a) has more recently argued
against incentives beyond inclusion of CCS in the EU ETS and
financial help for the early demonstration plants (2008b), but
its assessment is founded on uncertain and contestable
assumptions, e.g. regarding the future performance of the
EU ETS. Member State policies that could enhance the
economic feasibility of CCS include investment support for
demonstration projects, guaranteed CO2 prices to enable
domestic implementation, or feed-in subsidies for CCS-based
electricity supply.
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